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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v, : 
RICHARD JAIME YANEZ, : Case No. 20010087-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE IS REQUIRED TO PROVE AN ACTUAL 
INVESTIGATION OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WAS UNDERWAY 
IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE APPELLANT UNDER SECTION 76-8-
508(2)(c). 
The State asserts that subsection (2)(c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 ("witness 
tampering statute") should not be interpreted to mean that a person is guilty of witness 
tampering only if an actual investigation or criminal proceeding is underway. See State's 
Bripf ("S.B.") Point 1. The State argues, in part, that to do so would encourage people to 
act "with impunity" and "reward those who know that a report to the authorities is likely 
to be imminent and who act quickly to" threaten a witness. S.B. 16-17. The State 
overlooks the fact that any person who acts in this hypothetical manner is subject to 
criminal prosecution under other provisions of the Utah Code.1 Accordingly, the State's 
rationale is not compelling. 
1
 Yanez maintains his innocence in this case and does not concede that the State's 
allegations support prosecution of him under any criminal law theory. 
In footnote 4 to its brief, the State additionally claims that Yanez's reference to his 
due process right to be adequately informed of the charges against him was not preserved 
nor adequately briefed. On appeal, Yanez refers to his due process rights in an effort to 
folly explore the foil sweep and effect of the trial court's error below, and to reiterate this 
basic premise of criminal procedure. It is not the heart of his issue, and the issue on 
appeal can be resolved with or without an analysis of Yanez's due process right to be 
adequately informed. 
In any event, the topic is adequately briefed. Yanez cites the relevant 
constitutional provisions, see A.B. 15, and discusses how he was not afforded his right to 
be informed of the charges against him in that the court effectively changed the elements 
of the charge that was set forth in the Information to include the subjective belief element. 
In doing so, the court compromised Yanezfs ability to present a vigorous defense because 
the State was essentially permitted to meet its burden of proof by proving one less 
element than is required under subsection (2)(c), to wit, an actual investigation or 
proceeding underway at the time of the offense. SeeA.B. 15-16. Especially when read in 
context of all of Point I, Yanez adequately presented his argument to the Court. 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN 
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING 
THE CHARGE OF WITNESS TAMPERING. 
The State asserts that defense counsel at trial was not ineffective on the basis that 
any objection to the jury instructions, in light of the erroneous interpretation of subsection 
2 
(2)(c) of the witness tampering statute, see A.B. Point I, supra Point I, would be "futile." 
S.B. 22. Raising the challenge to the jury instruction would not have been futile as the 
State asserts. Rather, it would have been a second opportunity for defense counsel to 
explain to the court the need to interpret subsection (2)(c) as requiring proof of an actual 
investigation or criminal proceeding. 
Defense counsel's failure to raise this issue cannot be regarded as tactical either. 
See Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277,282 (Utah 1995). Since counsel could raise this 
issue under a different context (jury instructions) than a motion for arrested judgment 
based on statutory interpretation and sufficiency of the evidence, there is less risk of 
angering the trial judge than if counsel simply renewed the same objection that had 
already been adjudicated. Moreover, zealous advocacy requires that defense counsel 
request all appropriate remedies in order to provide the most rigorous defense possible, 
especially here where the plain language of the statute so clearly called for the objection. 
Hence, failure to challenge the jury instructions fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and was prejudicial to Yanez. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688, 694 (1984); see also A.B. 21-22 (discussing Yanez's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel).2 
2
 The State asserts that Yanez's challenges to the jury instructions on the 
sufficiency of the evidence are not properly before the court since he did not present a 
plain error or manifest injustice argument. See S.B. 19-20,24. This does not preclude 
appellate review since both issues are before this Court under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel analysis, which Yanez fully briefed in his opening brief. See A.B. 21-25; see 
3 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and based on the arguments set forth in his opening brief, 
Yanez respectfully requests this court to vacate his convictions for insufficient evidence. 
Alternatively, Yanez requests that this case be remanded for a new trial on the basis that 
the trial court erroneously decided that the State need not show an actual investigation or 
proceeding as required by the witness tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508(2)(c). Remand for a new trial is also required since the court erred as a matter of law 
in misinstructing the jury that the State need not show an actual investigation or 
proceeding to establish the offense of witness tampering. Finally, remand is appropriate 
since the trial court erroneously denied Yanez's motion to merge the offenses of witness 
tampering and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle since both crimes were established 
by the same evidence, to wit, the allegation that Yanez fired a gun.3 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jo^day of December, 2001. 
also State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App.1996) (recognizing three exceptions to the 
preservation rule: (1) plain error, (2) exceptional circumstances, and (3) ineffective 
assistance of counsel). Yanez need not argue all three exceptions to the preservation rule 
in order to properly bring an issue before this Court. It is sufficient to brief one of the 
exceptions for this Court to hear the issue on appeal. 
3
 Yanez submits on his opening brief in response to any arguments not specifically 
addressed herein. 
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